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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HARRY SUTTOX and
F. W. BLACK, doing business as
BAGER BEAVER ROOFIXG
CO)fPAXY,
Petitioners,
\

-v•.-

Crum

No. 9033

THE INDCSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, and
CURTIS OWEN RUPP,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF l<'AC'l'S
The Eager Beaver Roofing Company contracted with
one Graber for the application of a roof (Tr. 12). Eager
Beaver's foreman, Dan Reynolds, hired Glenn Curtis
and Curtis Owen Rupp to assist in the installation of
the roof (Tr. 40). On August 27, 1958, which was the

first day of work, the claimant, Curtis Owen Rupp, was
burned by hot tar (Tr. 10). Eager Beaver had no insurance coverage so Rupp made claim for compensation

1
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under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In a decision
rendered December 9, 1958, the Industrial Co=i~sion
found that Curtis Owcn Rupp was an employee of the
Eager Beaver Roofing Company and that t.he eompany
was liable for all medical a11d hospital expenses and
compensation until applicant if' releaHE>d.
STATEMENT OF 'l'lil<] CASE
'l'he sok question to be determined by thiH appeal is
whether the respondent, Curtis Owen Rupp, was an employee of the petitioner, Eager Beaver Hoofing Company, or an independent contractor in relation to the
petitioner. The law io; well ~e11letl as to the definition
and distinction between an employee and indep<mdent
contraetor. Ht-ricker v. lndustrial Commission, 55 U.
603, 188 P. 849; Christervn v. ln.rlustriaJ Commission, 113
U. 451, 196 P. 2d G02. The Ctah Legislature has defined
the terms as are found i11 the \Vorkmen's Compensation
Act, Section 35-1-42, U.C.A. 1953:
'''" • ~ \Vhere any employer procures any work to
be done wholly or in part for him by a eontractor
oYer whose work he retains supervision or control, and such work is a part or proee~s in the
tratlo or businc~" of tho employN, such r,onJractor,
and all persons employed l1y him, and all sub"(~on
tract.ors under him, and all persons employed by
any ~uch mbcontractors, shall be deemed, within
the meaning of this section, employees of such
original employer. Any person, firm or corporation engagetl in the performance of work us an independent co11tractor shall be deemed an employer
within the meaning of this section. The term 'independcut contractor,' as herein used, is defined
to be any person, association or corporation en2
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gng0d in the performance of any work for another,
11 lw, 11 !til<· 80 engaged, iR independent of the
emJJ]oyt'r in all that pertains to the execution of
the work, is not subject to the rule or control of
the employ0r, i,.; 0n7ag0d only in llw pcrform:mc0
of a ddiui1 r~ job or pit•(-e of wotk, and i~ subnrdinnt!' to tltl' employe,· only in effee!.ing a rl'sult in
a<'<·or·dmi('l' with the employer's desig11."
The l~tah Supreme Court, in the cn~e of Parki,ISUit v.
Industrial C'UIIii!iissi(ol, 110 n. :l09, In P. 2d 133, after
quoting the above f!tatute, f!tated:
"From thesr definitions it Ifl apparent that
'vhether a workman i~ an 'employee' or an 'independent contractor' ifl dependent on (1) whether
the employer hao;11H' right to control his execution
of the work, (2) whether the 'vork done or to be
done i~ a part or procr~s in the trade or busi11css
of the employer, and ( :l) whether the work done
or to be done i~ a definite job or piece of work.
In \Vorkmen'~ Compeno;ation cao;es-the courts have generally used thefle testR, and mainly number 1, to dctet·mine 11·hdher a person is an employee.
S'L\'l'KM~:X'l'

Qli' POL'\TS
Pomr I.

EAGER BEAVER ROOFTI\'G CO.MPANY HAD
THE RIG-HT TO COXTR01. TH~: WORK OF
CCRTIS 0\VEN RUPP.
Por:>~T

11.

WOHK PERFOI-L\'!f<]D OH TO BE PERFORJ'dED BY CURTIS OWJ<;X lWPP IS A
PART OR PROCESS TN 'l'Hl<j TH.1UlE OF
EAGER BEAVER ROOFING CO.\fPANY.
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.POINT

III.

Tll.E WORK PERFOR\rBD OR TO BE PERFORJviED BY GCRTTS 0\VEN HLPP TS )l"Q'l'
A DF:FINIT:E: ,TOB OH PliJJCE OF WORK.
PonrT TV.
THE EVIDENCE IS SCFFICIENT TO SUPPOUT TIHj DF:CTSHJ\' OF THE CO}C\flSSIOX.
ARGL}H~N'l'

PoiNT L

F:AG"ER BEAVER ROm'lXG ('(_l\IPA~l HAD
THF. RIGHT TO CO);TROL THE WORK OF
CCR'rTS 0\YF.X RCPP.
One of the factor~ which mu~t be eonsiU.creU. is V~hat
the intent of the Legislature was in t>n:wtin!! Srd.ion
35-1-4-2, U.C.A. 1953. In the case of "f'tah Fire Clay
Cotnpooy ,._ hulu.l'trial C0m111 i.o·8irm, 40 P. 2d 183, the company contracted with one H. 8. Jamt•s to furnish all
trucks and drivers to perform transportation and delivery service. Upon the injury of one of the drin•rs, the
court, in recognizing the contract relationship, held that
the Utah Fire Clay Company had the right to t>xrrcisc
control on:r the drivers of R. S. James. The court stated:
"The (]nestion for determination i~. not 11·hether
H. S. J:llll<'~ was a <.'ontractor, but whether. notwithstanding till_' contrad relatioilship which is
clearly shown and whil·l1 mig-ht be characterized by
some of the elements ineide11t to the relationship
of independent contractor, it is such a relationship
as is co>ered and referred to in the first sentence
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of the quoted section of the statute' as distinguished from the status of independent contractor
defined in the latter part of the flection. Such a
eontrwt is entirely proper and nol in any ~<'rt~e
uulawful. 'rhere is not anything in tl1c H\Htute
which ·would prr~l-<'11\ t11c eompany from l1a1·irll-(
it~ delivery work done under and punuant to sud1
contract. arnmgcment. The Legislature, however,
undettook by tl1is section to provide that workmen l'llJ-<!11-(('d in certain kinds of contract employment Hhould han• the benefit of the CompeJISHtion
Law, and ]JUs provided that such workmen are,
for tllC purposes of the act, to be regarded as employees of tile ('ontractee."
Again the Utah S11premr~ Court i11 tl1e l'n~e ol' A'/I..Qel
J.ndu3lrial Co-rn.mission of Clah, 22S P. 500, ti'H:<OnNl:
"~

Y.

* ~ The intent ion of I h1; Iir~t part of lhc statute

evidently waR to prr·YI'lll 11 l'll~lom, whieh was beearning prevalent 11 it h cmployl'fH, of parceling out,
under guise of contrnct~, the work l.o bt> performed
among many ow-cnllerl ('OntmctorR, while at the
sume time the employer retained supervision and
eoutrol of the work. Thi8 custom was clearly un
ilttempt to eYacle the provisions of the Industrial
.-'l.d and eonstituted the mischief whid1 tl1e Lcgi,;lature sought to remedy. In our opinion it made
no diange in the general law as it existed before
tl1c ad was passed, but it was, Jlever·t11<'l<'ss, a sol<'mn deelaration of the 1 ,et"i~iatnn• Hnd when eYer
tlie employer retained superYision and eont.rol of
tl1e work to he performed, uo matter what rcla1ion he had sought to establish, the workmt'n under
l1im \YI!re to be deemed his employes."
·
In Yiew of tl1e legislative intcnl, the eourt ~honld take
a clear vie11 of tbe fads of H1is l'n~e and the practice of
the roofing industry in trying to <'Vade their responsiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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bilities under the \Vorkmen 's Compensation Act by {·reating a subterfuge of the law by attempting to make their
employees independent coTJtraetors ur1der the guise of a
contract as set forth in tlw l'ad~ of 1his case. 'T'he Commission, in deciding this case, recognized this practice, for
it reads on page 50 of thE> transeript as foll<nV"s:
"\Ve have always looked with ~u01picion on a general practice in the roofing industry to contraet
labor. The usual result is a no-coverage case."
The Commission based its decision on the right to control,
for in its decision on page 50 of the transcript, it states:

"We emphasize the fact that the failure to exercise tho right to ctHJtrol is not controlling. It only
makes the problem more difficult. In most of the
cases there iH very little, if any, aduul visual r.ontrol although the right exists.
"Vle believe that thif! case is 8i.milar to Pleu Construction Company v. Ind. Com. 121 r. 375, 242
P. 2d 561, although the evidence in this case is not
as conclusive on the issue of control. .-\pparcntly,
there was no actual control exerr.ised hy Eager
BeaYer Roofii1g Company. H<nv<wor, there is some
evidence that Reynolds was a foreman and that he
hired applicant."
The facts and issue of the Plen Construction case, supra,
are almost identical with the case at hand. The following is a comparison of the two cases:
(1) Companies in both cases contracted for the installation of a roof and the roofers were to be paid by
the square (Tr. 15).

6
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(2) Initial instruet.ionA were given by the companies
in both cases as to how the roof should be put on ( Tr. 21).
(3) Tl1e roofers hired an additional man to assist
them; in the Pleu ('Use a shingler, and in the instant case,
Rupp, a kettleman ('rr. 31). The hiring in the prineipal
case lliUS done by l<Jager Beaver·~ foreman, whieh would
certainly rnalw Hnpp au employee of the company. Thf'
kstirnony of Olenn C'nrti><, Curtis Owen Hupp and \Vendellilarney wa~ that Blaek, one of the partners of Eager
Beanr, told them that ReynoJdg waR their foreman (Tr.
21, 34, 39). Black tried to deny this by qualifying his
answer and making a play 011 words as to wlmt the definition or a l'on•maTI is, ag-aiu trying to e1·fldc their regpon~ibili(ies under tht' Workmen'~ Compensation Act (Tr.
46). Reynolds was also gi.-en adYanee payments by F:agc•r
BeaYer Compauy, showing what a tru~ted l'mployc(' he
11as ('l'r. 2-l), 'T'his eourt should he extremely critical of
the position taken hy the petitioner.
Petitioner, on page 3 of his brief, denied that F:ag,•r
BeaYer employer! Hupp. EYen if this contention were
true, it would not weaken the respondents' poHition, for
in the Pleu ease, the court held tk1t Uw shingler was
an employee even though the roofers hired him by plaeing
an ad in the paper, and the I'Ompany had nothing to do
with the tH'tual hiring.
( 4) 'l'he additionul man was to he paid out of Hw
square price that the companies agreed to pay the roofers (Tr. 30). The instant ease CYen goes further, for
Eager Beaver paid Rupp direct for his time (Tr. 44).

7
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(5) JI.Iaterial for the roof was furnished by the com~
panies. 'l'he Eager Beaver Company even furnished the
roofer the use of thei1· trunks, \lhich certainly is an element of employment (Tr. 16).
(6) In either case, there was no set time to report
for or lean~ work.
(7) The petitioners in the Pleu ("li~e were at the job
and exercised w<tual control during the proees» of the
roofing, while in the prin<'ipal case one of the partners
was at the Job (Tr. 21) but the daimUTJt was i11jured during the morning of the first day's work before there was
an opportunity for the partner to exereise actual control. All of the elements of cont.rol 11·C'te present, but
there wa,; no ne(•csJ>ity to exercise control other than the
i11itial instructions wllid1 were giYerl. Tf tlw job l1ad proceeded af! in the Pleu case, and the roof \Hi~ put on wrong
as in that case, Eager Beaver ""1\"0llld have certainly
stepped in Ulld exctcised their right. The rtah Supreme
Court, in the ca~e of Parkinson v.Jn,lu.<lrial Commissio11,
supra, stated:
''The most important of the determinatiw~ of the
relationship bet 1n•en workman and employer i~
tbat ol' control. Tbe existence of a potential right
to control is ,;td1i('iPnt to create the relationship
even though that· right is in fact lll'H'f (•.-.;ercised.
Luker Sand & Gra"''l Co. ,., Industrial Commis·
si011, supra; Ftah Fin' Chty Co. ,-, Industrial
Corum., 86 Utah 1, 40 P. :!,1183; Annotation 120
A. L. R. 1031. To determine 11·hethcr the right to
cOTltrol 0xist~, all facts and cir(';Jm~tances of the
relationship mu~t be exa'mihed. 'l'he contract be·

8
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tween the parties ordinarily does not <:>xpressly
mention the right of control. And even though it
expressly abjure's control by the employer, yet
tbe l'mployei'-cmployee relationship may exi:;t. if in
l";wt tlie l'ight to control exists."
'fhe right to l"Ontrol \1"1h preseut and the dceision of tlll'
IndustriHl ('omrnission should be upheld.
Pomr II.

WOHK PEHFOlL\ll<:D OH TO HJ<j PliJRfUIL\Jl<jD BY (!LHT18 OWK\ lWPP lS A
P.\.lt'l' OH Pl\0( '!<:8S IX 'l'lU<: TlL\.Dl~ OF
Kl.(;.I£H BKl.VJ<:H HOOFIXO CO.JIPAXY.
'l'hc next fad or to lw em1sidcrcll i~ wh0tlwr th0 work
performed l•y Hupp 11!1~ a pnrj or pr•w•.'.-'" iu the business
,1£ .l!:agf'r Bem·er Hoofing Company. Thic: factor is only
important as to how i: affecj~ the c-OJI!rul aspect, fo1· in
11tc' Parkinson ca~L', supra, the court said;
the work to lJe done is a part or pr"l'I'S>'
of the employer's busint>sf!, it is more probable
thai the employer would closely supC'lTise Hnlt
part or proresOt and therefore more probable t.hat
he has the ri!)."ht to c-ontrol how tlw workman does
hifl job. • "' "'"
"~ ~ ~If

The Supreme Court of Utah in the Ctah Fire Clay ease,
supra, in quoting from the Arizona case of Grab10 v. fnilus-

trial Crmuni.<siuu, 290 P. 10:-n, ~tateo:l:
'·A procures B to do cGJ'tain work for him whid1
is a part or process in A's trade or bui!iness, mJd
n•tain~ supervision or control Ol"('r the work, then
Band all B'~ employees ano:l subeontrartors to the
Xth degree fll'f', for the purposes of the Comper19
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.o,ation Act, employees of A, no matter what the
terms or method of employment or compensation.
Tt is ohviou~ that were this not so ihc beneficent
purposes of the aet could and would he easily defeated or CVM.dcd hy unscrupulous employers
thr011gh ihe aid of various dummy intermediaries.
'l'he ~tatute therefore brushes aside all forms and
subterfuges and ptovides that one just, ~imple,
and definite test. If t.lw work be part of the regular husinef!s of Jhe alleged employer, docs he retai11
supervision or control thereof 1 ..ill other matters
are of importailce OII]y as they throw light on this
q11Cstion.''
'!'here if! no doubt that the installation of the roof was
part of the process or Jradc of ihc ~ager Beaver Roofing Company, for their business is roofing. They entered
into a contract with Graber for the installation of a
roof, and did not enter into a coni ract io contract for the
installation of the roof; in the one case a contract and
the other case a contract to emJtract.
PoiNT TTL

THE WORK PERFORMl<:D OR. TO BE PERFORMED BY l'rH.TU3 0\\']!;_:.,.: RUPP TS XOT
A DEFTNTTJ<j JOB OR PIECE OF WORK
The definite job tPst, like the part or process test, is
only important as to "-hat bearing it ha8 on the right
to controL This h'8t does not mean only whether a person performs a definite joh, for mnn_,. employees do that,
but whether it is a job that i;; not directly related to the
employN'f! business, and one for "·hich he would hire
an independent enntractor to perfurm. The Parkinson
case, supra, st.utes:

10
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''The test of a 'definite job or piece of work' must
he taken largely with the fact that such work is of
tlu.~ type that the workman did as part of his independent ('1llling, i.0., l-1is 'own business.' CeriHinly
many employees do a definite job or piece of work.
In fact any employee does that at a partieular
time. The definite job meant is something not
mmally done by the employer a~ part of his business but something he usually gets some outside
party to do. * * *''
'l'he petitioner, on page 3 of his brief, takes the position
that ''Glenn Curtis was engaged only to do a definite
job and was free from the control of the pa1·tnersl1ip in
performanee of the work." AlU10ugh the respondent
does not agree with U1is positimi, the fact still remains
that Curtis Owen Happ was hired by Eager Beaver's
foremaa as a kettleman to perform a ministerial task,
which would certainly not be a definite joL.

PoiNT IV.
THE RYJDJ<j:\CE IS SUFFICIENT TO RCPPORT 'T'HJ<j lH:iCISIOX OF THE COMMlSSION.
The "Ctab eases are voluminous on the position taken
by the Supreme Court of the state in tlu• <'>1se of Park
Utah Consol. J!ines Company v. Industrial Commission,
S.J. r. 481, :Jfi P. :.!d 9i2. It was there said:
"It seem~ daft and unjnristie, certainly malapropos, that this court should be required to repeatedly expostulate with legists about principles so
well establi~l1ei'l, and to so frequently reaffi1m tlmt
the findings and eondusions of the commission on
questions of fact arc conclusive, and fiiJa! and arc

11
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nat subject to review, " • • and that they cannot
be disturbed unless it appears as a matter of law
that they are contrary to law and contrary to the
evidence. We cannot weigh conflicting evidence,
nor direct whirll of the two or more reasonable inferences ought to be drawn from evidence not in
conflict. " " ~ In the determining of facts the
conclusions of the commission are like the verdict
of a jury, and will not be interfered with by this
court when supported by some substantial
evidence.''
As is set forth above, there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the commission.

COXCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Court should
•
affirm the decision of the Commission.

Respectfully submitted

WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
HOMER F. WILKINSON
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys far Respondents
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